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WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Monica Hakimi*
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Harold
Hongju Koh. New York: Oxford University Press. 2018. Pp. 232.
$27.95.
INTRODUCTION
International lawyers are used to having their discipline dismissed. A
conspicuous strand of thought in U.S. foreign policy circles—known as realist—posits that international law does not matter. Realists of course recognize that states and other global actors speak the language of international
law. But they view this discourse as cheap talk or epiphenomenal. They contend that state decisions on the international plane are animated not by the
dictates of international law but by material interests and power. States act
consistently with international law insofar as they have independent reasons
for acting that way. If those reasons dry up, states, especially powerful states,
can just violate the law; because the international legal system lacks centralized enforcement agents, any repercussions for the violation will be determined not by law but by the participants’ own interests and power relations.
International law is again irrelevant. 1
The realist position goes to the heart of the enterprise, so international
relations and legal scholars have devoted enormous energy to refuting it.
There is now an expansive literature on the efficacy of international law.
Most of this work measures international law’s efficacy in terms that realists

* James V. Campbell Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, I am grateful to Harlan Grant Cohen, Jeffrey Dunoff, Douglas Guilfoyle, Don Herzog, Ian Hurd, Julian Davis Mortenson, Georg Nolte, Richard Primus,
Steven Ratner, Wayne Sandholtz, Brian Willen, and the participants in workshops at Northwestern University, the Max Planck Institute, and the Kolleg-Forschungsgruppe research
group “International Rule of Law—Rise or Decline?”
1. This strand of thought has roots in international relations theory. See, e.g., AnneMarie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 214 (1993) (describing the realist claim that international law is not “capable of producing outcomes significantly different from those that a pure power theory would
predict”); Richard H. Steinberg, Wanted – Dead or Alive: Realism in International Law, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
146, 165 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (“Without elaboration from other
disciplines and approaches, it is hard to identify what ‘work’ law is doing—how and why it affects behavior and outcomes, and the contexts in which it does so.”).
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can appreciate, by asking whether international law helps to achieve specific
policy outcomes—for example, reductions in greenhouse gas emissions,
trade restrictions, or incidents of torture. The analysis ultimately turns on
the facts. But it also entrenches a particular view of what makes international
law worthwhile. It suggests that international law matters insofar as it advances the material outcomes that it itself prescribes.
Harold Hongju Koh 2 has contributed enormously to this debate. More
than twenty-five years ago, he articulated what is now a foundational theory
about the efficacy of international law. 3 The theory, in essence, is that states
are habituated to comply with international law through a complex transnational legal process. Once a state engages with international law, disparate
actors within and outside of government can invoke it to foster “institutional
interaction whereby global norms are not just debated and interpreted, but
ultimately internalized by domestic legal systems.” 4 Internalized norms operate as domestic law; they establish “default patterns of international lawobservant behavior,” which are “routinized and ‘sticky’ and thus difficult to
deviate from without sustained effort” (p. 7). So the reason that international
law is effective is that the transnational legal process pushes states toward
obeying its mandates and thereby achieving its prescribed outcomes.
In The Trump Administration and International Law, Koh argues for reinvigorating this process during the presidency of Donald Trump. The
Trump Administration, not coincidentally, describes its foreign policy as realist. 5 The central message of its “America First” platform has been that international law is not particularly relevant to the uberpowerful United
States. 6 Koh counters that message with two claims about the efficacy of international law. First, international law has constrained U.S. foreign policy
and curtailed U.S. disobedience even under President Trump. Second, international law could empower Trump. The president would be more effective
at achieving longstanding U.S. foreign policy goals if, instead of dismissing
international law, he harnessed it to get things done. To support these
claims, Koh works through several policy issues, ranging from immigration
to climate change to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The up-

2. Sterling Professor of International Law, Yale Law School.
3. Harold Hongju Koh, Refugees, the Courts, and the New World Order, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 999, 1014–18. For Koh’s two foundational pieces on the transnational legal process, see
Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995), and
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?], and Harold Hongju Koh, Lecture, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
4. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 3, at 2602.
5. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1 (2017) (“An America First National Security Strategy is . . . a strategy of principled
realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology.”).
6. See infra Part III.
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shot, which is certainly worth highlighting, is that international law can have
real operational value, including—perhaps especially—for the United States.
But Koh did not write the book just to reiterate that point. He is clearly
worried that Trump is doing damage both to the current international legal
order and to the U.S. relationship with it. Thus, he intends for the book to be
a “call to action.” 7 He implores people to keep using the transnational legal
process to uphold international law and to fight the Trump Administration’s
antagonistic policies.
This is where the book falls short. It does not give readers compelling
reasons to fight not just against Donald Trump but for international law.
What about international law is both worthwhile and at risk under President
Trump? The final chapter—entitled “What’s at Stake”—is meant to address
this question, but the answer is cursory. Koh says that Trump threatens the
U.S.-led, Kantian global order in which “states collectively explicate shared
moral commitments to democracy, the rule of law, individual freedom, and
the mutual advantages derived from peaceful intercourse . . . to achieve
shared outcomes” (p. 143). As I will discuss, Koh expands on this claim in
the rest of the book. But his normative case for international law remains
thin. He is not alone. Many people advance similar narratives about international law, 8 even though many others have argued that these narratives are
too pat 9 or have reported being unmoved by them. 10
So, we still have work to do. Those of us who are invested in international law need to drill down to explain what makes Trump corrosive and
why people should care. And to do that, I’ll argue, we need to look beyond
the old efficacy debate, which frames international law’s relevance primarily,
if not entirely, in terms of the discrete regulatory outcomes that it helps to
produce. That frame is too narrow in two respects. The first arguably is im-

7. See Harold Koh, Trump vs. International Law: He’s Not Winning, OPINIO JURIS (Oct.
2, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/10/02/trump-vs-international-law-hes-not-winning/
[https://perma.cc/JER8-DCED].
8. See, e.g., G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS, CRISIS, AND
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER (2011); Ian Hurd, Enchanted and Disenchanted International Law, 7 GLOBAL POL’Y 96 (2016) (describing the claim’s prevalence and
then critiquing it).
9. See, e.g., Graham Allison, Essay, The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2018, at 124; Patrick Porter, Policy
Analysis, A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order, CATO INST. (June 5, 2018),
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/world-imagined-nostalgia-liberal-order (on
file with the Michigan Law Review).
10. In an extensive study on the foreign policy views of U.S. voters, the partisan Center
for American Progress found that “traditional language from foreign policy experts about
‘fighting authoritarianism and dictatorship,’ ‘promoting democracy,’ or ‘working with allies
and the international community’ uniformly fell flat. . . . Voters across educational lines simply
did not understand what any of these phrases and ideas meant or implied.” John Halpin et al.,
America Adrift: How the U.S. Foreign Policy Debate Misses What Voters Really Want, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (May 5, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security
/reports/2019/05/05/469218/america-adrift/ [https://perma.cc/GMB3-EP77].
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plicit in Koh’s theory of the transnational legal process. International law
shapes behavior in complex and diffuse ways, not all of them captured by indicia of obedience. It might have regulatory purchase, even when its material
impact cannot be neatly isolated or measured.
The second point is more fundamental. International law does important work apart from the material outcomes that it produces. In this Review, I draw on insights from legal and political philosophy to advance a
claim that, though straightforward, is often elided in American conversations about international law: a lot of what makes law worthwhile, both domestically and at the international level, is that it commits us “to a certain
method of arguing about the exercise of public power.” 11 International law
invites people across national borders to communicate in relatively constructive ways about what is happening in the world, why it is happening, and
whether anything should be done about it. This discursive practice is not, as
some suggest, just cheap talk, 12 a means for achieving concrete ends, 13 or a
smokescreen for reinforcing positions of dominance. 14 It has independent, if
somewhat intangible, value. And it is deteriorating under President Trump.
I.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN OPERATIONAL TOOL

Koh weaves three normative claims about international law into his
book. He variously contends: (1) that international law helps to produce desirable material outcomes, (2) that states should obey it to achieve these outcomes, and (3) that the United States should harness it to exercise leadership
in solving concrete problems. These claims are all about international law’s
11. Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law as a Theater of Debate, in DWORKIN AND HIS
CRITICS 319, 330 (Justine Burley ed., 2004).
12. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 170–84 (2005).
13. Koh hints at this position in the book. See, e.g., p. 11 (arguing for “blending legal
arguments with other tools . . . to achieve complex foreign policy outcomes that cannot be
achieved without the legitimacy that international law bestows”); p. 105 (“Going forward, the
broader U.S. counterterrorism approach cannot maintain its effectiveness unless it preserves its
perceived legality.”). However, he has pushed the position more forcefully in other work. For
example, he has argued that the U.S. practice of exempting itself from various human rights
obligations is “more America’s problem than the world’s” because “the relevant question is not
nonratification but noncompliance”—that is, whether the United States is working to achieve
the material outcomes that international law prescribes—and the United States has a “practice
of . . . compliance without ratification.” Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1484, 1485 (2003). On the more general suggestion that international law’s “justificatory discourse” matters because it “generates pressure on states to
behave in accordance with the law,” see IAN JOHNSTONE, THE POWER OF DELIBERATION:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS AND ORGANIZATIONS 7 (2011).
14. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, International Law and International Relations: Together, Apart, Together?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 93, 94 (2000) (“If there were rules at all, they would be set
by powerful states, and these rules would change if the distribution of power changed.”);
Makau Mutua, What Is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31, 31 (2000) (“[I]nternational
law is illegitimate. It . . . reproduces and sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third
World by the West.” (footnote omitted)).
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efficacy as an operational tool. They are not, in my view, wrong. But they are
on their own terms overdrawn or unsubstantiated. They do not make a
strong case that people, especially Americans, should support international
law or that President Trump poses it an unusual threat.
A. Material Outcomes
Koh at times speaks of international law as if its outcomes are selfevidently desirable. For example, he defends the current international legal
order on the grounds that it establishes the “basis for our United Nations
system to end war and promote human rights, our treaty structure for mutual security (e.g., NATO), and our system to end global depression and poverty” and that it “enable[s] . . . like-minded nations to organize an ambitious
multilateral assault on all manner of global problems: e.g., climate change,
denuclearization, intellectual property, and global health” (p. 143). This
claim is articulated at such a high level of abstraction that it’s hard to imagine a normative objection. Would anyone seriously contend that we need
more war or poverty in the world? If international law consistently alleviates
such problems, then surely it does good and deserves our support.
One could at this point ask whether international law actually alleviates
such problems. On a number of the issues that Koh mentions, the relevant
international law is widely perceived to have little or no material impact. But
I want to stay focused on the normative question: Assuming that international law is effective in advancing the outcomes that it prescribes, are these
outcomes desirable? To substantiate the claim that they are, one needs to defend their actual policy content, not an abstract ideal of what that content
might be. For example, let’s stipulate that international law would do good if
it created a “system to end war” (p. 143). It does not do that, at least not unless we define “war” so narrowly as to exclude a lot of conduct that looks exactly like war. Positive international law entitles states to conduct military
operations in a broad range of circumstances involving the U.N. Security
Council’s authorization, the territorial state’s consent, or a justifiable claim
of self-defense. It prohibits some armed conflicts but permits many others. 15
To defend the outcomes that international law helps to produce, one would
have to justify not only the norms for ending war but also the norms that license it. Koh does not embark on that project.
If Koh had his way, international law would permit states to use military
force in more circumstances than it by most accounts already does. He
claims that states may occasionally use force without the U.N. Security
Council’s authorization or the territorial state’s consent in order to avert
humanitarian crises (pp. 127–40). Although this claim has been extensively
debated, the majority position continues to be that it does not reflect positive
15. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 51; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 246 (June 27) (recognizing that an outside state’s forcible intervention “is already allowable at the request of the government of a
State”).
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law. 16 The persistent debate on it—as on many other issues relating to the
use of force—reveals that people disagree, often vehemently, about the outcomes that international law should prescribe. In pushing a claim that is not
widely accepted as law, Koh himself suggests that the law must be improved.
None of this should be surprising. It’s completely routine for people to
disagree about what law should prescribe. But because they disagree, the
claim that international law consistently produces desirable outcomes is
hard to sustain. Koh’s readers are likely to find some of its outcomes appealing and others problematic. They can reasonably ask why they should support not just the specific regulatory arrangements that reflect their own
priorities but the entire enterprise of international law, warts and all.
A more modest version of Koh’s claim might be that, despite international law’s many imperfections, its material impact is, on the whole, positive; it produces more good than harm. 17 Yet even this more modest claim
needs to be substantiated. 18 Many people, including on the American political left, are disenchanted by international law, to the extent that they think
about it at all. They complain that international law advances a neoliberal
economic agenda to the detriment of other social policies, that it systematically underrepresents the priorities of people in the global south, that it in
various ways empowers corrupt and repressive governments, that it frustrates the claims to statehood by disenfranchised groups, that it unduly burdens developing states that want to use nuclear technology for clean energy,
and so on and so forth. 19 The question thus remains: why should people
commit to international law if it produces, or at least does not impede, many
material outcomes that they find repellent?
B. Obedience
Koh gestures toward an answer with his claim that states should obey international law. This claim to some extent collapses into the first: Why
should they obey international law if it does not do good? But we can con-

16. E.g., Declaration of the South Summit, GRP. 77 S. SUMMIT (Apr. 14, 2000),
http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm
[https://perma.cc/4NT7-JASH]
(“We reject the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention . . . .”); Christine Gray, The Use of
Force for Humanitarian Purposes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
AND SECURITY LAW 229, 253 (Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson eds., 2013) (“It is difficult, if not impossible, to make a legal case for the existence of a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention today.”).
17. See pp. 2–3 (“Since World War II, the leading democratic nations of the world have
collectively worked toward an admittedly imperfect, but adequately functioning, Kantian vision of a law-governed international society.”).
18. For one effort, see STEVEN R. RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A MORAL RECKONING OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (2015).
19. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez & David Lachman, Address to the American Society of International Law: International Law: 50 Ways It Harms Our Lives (June 22, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991336 [https://perma.cc
/K8NA-VQVE].
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struct a version of the claim that is not contingent on international law’s policy content. The claim would be that obedience is valuable in its own right,
for reasons that often get lumped together under the rubric of the rule of
law.
The rule of law generally refers not to what law is in a jurisprudential
sense but to what makes law, as a political project, worthwhile. Why and under what conditions should we aspire to live in a society governed by law?
Although accounts of the rule of law differ, the one that is most prominent
in international legal circles prioritizes obedience to law, as a way of ensuring that states do not exercise power arbitrarily or unpredictably. In this account, the rule of law requires (1) relatively precise and transparent conduct
rules, (2) that are consistently and impartially applied, (3) to constrain the
discretion of the people who are in positions to govern. 20 Defining the rule of
law in these terms puts a normative gloss on Koh’s theory about the transnational legal process. To the extent that the process habituates states to “ ‘obey’
international law, rather than merely conform their behavior to it when convenient,” 21 they end up following and being constrained by its conduct rules,
which is what many say the rule of law requires.
But as other scholars have underscored, that account of the rule of law
was developed with domestic legal systems in mind and translates poorly to
international law. 22 In national settings, the main justification for establishing stable conduct rules that constrain governmental discretion is to protect
individuals from abuses that might accompany the centralization of power in
the hands of the state. 23 Without constraints on state power, the state could
arbitrarily or excessively use law to create a living hell for its people; it could
establish the rule by law instead of the rule of law. That risk is more remote
with international law. Although international law occasionally also touches

20. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004); Geert De Baere et
al., International Courts as Keepers of the Rule of Law: Achievements, Challenges, and Opportunities, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 715, 752, 753 (2016) (arguing that international courts and
tribunals contribute to the international rule of law by “rendering the law clearer, more predictable, and more coherent,” providing for its “consistent and impartial enforcement,” and
“ensuring that legal rules prevail over power in the settlement of disputes”); Jutta Brunnée,
Keynote Speech Part III: Challenging International Law: What’s New?, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 19,
2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/11/19/keynote-speech-part-iii-challenging-international-law
-whats-new/ [https://perma.cc/P92M-JMRY] (arguing that a pattern of rule breaking and hypocrisy by Western states has helped to undercut the international rule of law).
21. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 3, at 2603.
22. See IAN HURD, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 19–46 (2017); Jacob
Katz Cogan, Essay, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 189
(2006); Jeremy Waldron, Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of
Law?, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 315, 323 (2011). To be clear, I am not here arguing that international
law cannot satisfy the criteria for, or be consonant with, the rule of law. I am arguing that the
criteria that many associate with the rule of law are probably the wrong criteria for defining or
appraising the rule of law at the international level.
23. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 22, at 317–23.
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people directly, as with criminal prosecutions before international courts, its
impact on individual lives is usually more attenuated. As Koh’s theory highlights, international law is generally mediated through domestic legal systems. Because national actors must take steps to implement it, they
ultimately retain the power to make it relevant (or not) in people’s lives.
Thus, while individuals still need robust protections from governmental decisions at the national level, including perhaps decisions relating to international law, they are, for structural reasons, more shielded from what happens
on the international plane.
Some might be tempted to analogize the position of individuals in national law to that of states in international law—to posit that states need
comparable protections from arbitrariness and abuse. But the analogy does
not work. 24 The international legal system is highly decentralized, so even
states that are relatively weak by conventional standards retain considerable
control over how international law affects them and their people. A state can
opt out of treaties or treaty provisions that it dislikes. 25 It can help define international law’s content not only at the initial moment of prescription but
continually over time. 26 If it disagrees with other states, it can obstruct their
efforts to achieve their goals through law. It can try to shift decisionmaking
to arenas that will be more amenable to its preferences. 27 Or it can evade its
obligations and suffer the consequences, which in many contexts are insignificant. 28 The bottom line is that states have levers of power and resistance
that are mostly unavailable to individuals in national law.
To be sure, a state might face pressure, at times even severe pressure, not
to use those levers. And there are circumstances in which one state’s compliance with international law helps to protect other states (or their people)
from arbitrary or excessive exercises of power. But the coercion that a state
experiences in the ordinary course of its international relations is not at all
comparable to that which it routinely imposes on its own people. The state
less often (though not never) needs the same protections from abuse. Moreover, although we might still prioritize obedience to international law for
24. See id. at 322–26.
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 19, 24, 54–60, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
26. Id. arts. 31–32 (on interpretation of treaties).
27. SURABHI RANGANATHAN, STRATEGICALLY CREATED TREATY CONFLICTS AND THE
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2014) (describing as common the practice of creating
new treaties to undercut or challenge existing treaties); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack,
Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94
MINN. L. REV. 706, 744 (2010) (“[I]ndividual states (or other actors) may deliberately use softlaw instruments to undermine hard-law rules to which they object, or vice-versa, creating an
antagonistic relationship between these legal instruments.”).
28. The perceived inadequacy of international law’s enforcement mechanisms has
spawned an extensive literature on whether—and, if so, how—international law has regulatory
purchase. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 CHI. L. REV. 469, 489–91 (2005); Jens David Ohlin, Nash Equilibrium
and International Law, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 915, 918 (2012).
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other reasons that are independent of its content—for example, to foster
predictability or coordination in global affairs—these reasons are ultimately
not about protecting individuals from state power. They are less salient than
the reasons for insisting that states constrain themselves through domestic
law, so they more readily budge in the face of competing considerations.
The competing considerations can be significant. States vary enormously in their needs, interests, values, and capacities. Insisting that they all consistently obey the same conduct rules will in many (though again not all)
circumstances be counterproductive or itself a source of oppression. Any one
rule is likely to be inconsistent with what the people in some states need or
want, or with what their governments can realistically provide. This helps
explain why so much of international law does not come in the form of stable conduct rules—why its content is often fluid or contextually variable, rather than fixed or consistently applied. 29 States demand and to some extent
need the flexibility to adapt international law to their own circumstances.
Indeed, given the world’s diversity, pushing them all to obey the very same
conduct rules will often mean locking them into arrangements that they accepted before the full implications were apparent, or expecting them to go
along with majoritarian preferences in the interests of international cooperation. There is little reason to believe that those results would systematically
advance basic rule-of-law values, such as justice, fairness, and human freedom.
The point is not that states should aimlessly disregard international law
but that the normative case for establishing conduct rules that all states consistently obey, no matter the content, is weaker than many assume. Koh’s
theory of course places a premium on obedience. But even he recognizes that
obedience is not the be-all, end-all. For example, he defends President
Obama’s policy of targeting to kill suspected terrorists and President
Trump’s 2017 decision to strike Syria for the use of chemical weapons
(pp. 98–100, 131). In defending these actions, Koh takes legal positions that
are at best highly controversial and at worst contrary to positive law. 30 If

29. Many international legal instruments either define state obligations in contextually
variable terms, afford states some discretion to decide what measures they will take to satisfy
their own obligations, or allow them to limit the scope or effect of particular obligations as applied to them. See, e.g., Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change arts. 2(2) & 4(2), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104; International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. XX & XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling arts. X(3)
& VIII, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716. Thus, international law often does not insist that all states
consistently obey the same conduct rules. For more on this point, see Monica Hakimi, The
Work of International Law, 58 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 18–26 (2017); HURD, supra note 22, at 32–36;
and Ralf Michaels, Beyond Universalism and Particularism in International Law—Insights from
Comparative Law and Private International Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. ONLINE 18 (2019).
30. On the controversy surrounding U.S. targeted killing operations, see Monica Hakimi, Review Essay, The Theory and Practice at the Intersection Between Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 1063, 1064–67 (2017). On the Syria strikes, see, for ex-
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obedience were really paramount, he presumably would advocate for “safe”
positions to ensure U.S. compliance. The fact that he does not suggests that
other considerations are in his view more compelling. Obedience for obedience’s sake is not a sufficiently strong reason for Koh to insist on particular
outcomes.
Let’s bring this back to Donald Trump. Koh does not suggest that there
has been a significant uptick in U.S. disobedience under President Trump.
He argues that the transnational legal process has in various ways constrained Trump. For example, he notes that although candidate Trump
threatened to bring back “waterboarding and a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding,” the prohibition of torture was sufficiently internalized in the
United States that it was “not so easily ousted” (pp. 34, 37). The “danger,”
according to Koh, is mostly prospective—that Trump will over time “undo
the ‘stickiness’ of our standing rules and institutions by ‘ungluing’ the elements of administrative and transnational governance that maintain obedience to international rules” (p. 16). Koh never explains why Trump’s
violations would be more problematic than past U.S. actions that either also
violated international law or, like the targeted killing and Syria operations
that Koh defends, were widely perceived to have violated international law.
But without such an explanation, we cannot assess the seriousness of
Trump’s threat. After all, international law seemed to flourish before
Trump’s presidency, despite a litany of actual or perceived U.S. violations.
C. American Leadership
Koh elsewhere suggests that Trump’s threat to the global order comes
from his bombastic approach to foreign policy. As Koh describes it, Trump’s
foreign policy is defined by a constant emphasis on U.S. hard power, the
“systematic disengagement from nearly all institutions of global governance,” and “claims that there are no rules that bind our conduct” (pp. 6, 13).
Koh argues that this approach to U.S. foreign policy is problematic because it
prevents the United States from exercising global leadership, which it historically has done by harnessing international law to “achieve complex foreign
policy outcomes” (p. 11).
Koh’s claim about American leadership surfaces, for example, in his discussion of the North Korea nuclear situation. Koh contends that, although
the Trump Administration belittled Obama’s policies on North Korea, it
“will have little choice but to revert to a variant of [those] policies” (p. 77).
The reason why is that “the only meaningful measure of its success is how
quickly, concretely, and transparently it ensures the removal or destruction
of Kim Jong-un’s nuclear arsenal” (p. 76). To accomplish that outcome, Koh
ample, Julian Ku, Trump’s Syria Strike Clearly Broke International Law—And No One Seems to
Care, VOX (Apr. 19, 2017, 8:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/4/19/15345686
/syria-un-strike-illegal-un-humanitarian-law [https://perma.cc/ZH24-MFTF]; Marko Milanovic, The Clearly Illegal US Missile Strike in Syria, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.
ejiltalk.org/the-clearly-illegal-us-missile-strike-in-syria [https://perma.cc/KN2V-WTHE].
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says, the administration “must pursue a carefully negotiated global diplomatic solution that builds a binding legal regime firmly rooted in international law” (p. 80).
Koh surely is right that international law would be part of any serious effort to denuclearize North Korea. But that just begs the question whether
denuclearization is, in the administration’s view, “the only meaningful
measure of its success” (p. 76). Perhaps the administration’s foreign policy is
driven by something other than a desire “to achieve complex foreign policy
outcomes” (p. 11). As Koh at one point concedes, Trump does not want the
United States to lead as it historically has done (p. 6). Lots of people share
that position; they are ambivalent or worse about U.S. leadership, especially
under President Trump. 31
Koh dismisses that position out of hand. “[I]n the international order,”
he says, “there remains only one United States, which, regardless of who is
its president, plays a critical role as a balance wheel of the international system” (p. 139). For Koh, the reason to maintain this system, with the United
States at the helm, boils down to the material outcomes that the United
States can achieve; these outcomes would be unattainable without U.S. leadership. But if that is the reason for insisting on U.S. leadership, U.S. foreign
policy must be defended on the merits. Unsurprisingly, many people doubt
that it has consistently produced outcomes that were better than the available alternatives or find it objectionable precisely because it is so omnipresent.
More to the point: Even if the United States has historically done more
good than harm in the world, why should we think that it will continue to do
so? In the current geopolitical climate—characterized by emboldened nationalist movements at home and elsewhere, an already sprawling U.S. military footprint, and a decline in the relative power of the United States—
insisting on U.S. leadership might exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, global
problems. 32 Or it might mean exporting our domestic troubles or regressive
politics to other parts of the world. We should at least entertain the possibility that the United States would do good by taking a step back.
*

*

*

Where does this leave us? Koh’s case for international law focuses on its
efficacy in achieving concrete policy outcomes. Koh variously contends that
these outcomes are desirable, that states should obey international law to
achieve them, and that the United States should take the lead in defining
them. His normative claims about international law are, in the end, unsatisfying. Part of the problem is that they are too sweeping. Each needs consid-

31. For an example from the American political left, see Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Bernie Sanders Imagines a Progressive New Approach to Foreign Policy, NEW YORKER (Apr. 13,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-political-scene/bernie-sanders-imagines-a-pro
gressive-new-approach-to-foreign-policy [https://perma.cc/4KZQ-P38J].
32. See, e.g., Allison, supra note 9.
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erably more work to be substantiated or refined. The more fundamental
problem is that they all boil down to the question whether international law’s
outcomes are actually for the good. They might be. But in any large-scale
human group, especially one that encompasses the entire world, people are
bound to disagree on that question. If we want to make a compelling case for
the enterprise of international law, and not just for specific regulatory arrangements to certain groups of people, we need to broaden our normative
lens and look beyond the discrete material outcomes that it might produce.
Focusing so intently on these outcomes is problematic for another reason as well: It occludes the nature of Trump’s threat. As Koh recognizes,
Trump’s foreign policy is not defined by disobedience to international law or
by disinterest in global affairs, although it contains elements of each. 33 It is
defined by hostility to the overall project of international law. Koh suggests
that this hostility is a problem insofar as it impedes the United States from
achieving the material outcomes that are now or might in the future be prescribed in international law. He cites several cases in which such outcomes
are sustained, despite Trump’s antics, for the proposition that Trump’s approach to foreign policy “leads nowhere” or is “failing to achieve its desired
goals.” 34 I think that assessment misses what Trump is up to and understates
what’s at stake during his presidency.
III. AMERICA FIRST
Taking a legal system seriously involves more than just making and
obeying a bunch of rules for accomplishing discrete policy goals. It involves
accepting the basic distinction between sheer power and legitimate authority. Law signals not just that certain outcomes can be produced but that they

33. See also Jack Goldsmith & Shannon Togawa Mercer, International Law and Institutions in the Trump Era, 61 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 17) (on file with
the Michigan Law Review) (“Relatively few Trumpian innovations involve outright violations
of international law.”); Ingrid Wuerth, International Law and the Trump Administration,
LAWFARE (Mar. 29, 2017, 9:58 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-law-andtrump-administration [perma.cc/PV5D-JSG8] (“[T]he Trump administration has conspicuously—and surprisingly—complied with international law during its first months.”).
34. Pp. 6, 68; see also, e.g., p. 208 (“A pattern has emerged whereby Trump signals that
he will disrupt a previously settled relationship, the media explodes, U.S. allies push back,
Trump partially recants, and policy eventually resettles in roughly the same place that it was
before Trump roiled the waters.”); p. 211 (“What this book has shown is that thus far, the resilience of American institutions has largely checked Trump at home.”). To be fair, Koh at times
says things that can be interpreted to mean that engaging with the transnational legal process is
worthwhile, even when it does not advance any discrete material outcomes. For example, he
argues that the United States should try to justify its actions in law when they are controversial
because doing so “would at least tie the United States’ present actions to a broader set of principles that explain why the United States believes it is acting lawfully” and would “clarify the
future circumstances in which the United States believes it is legally empowered to act.” P. 134.
However, Koh does not develop this idea or explain how it is consistent with his claim that
Trump’s foreign policy “leads nowhere.” P. 68.
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may, that what is being done is in some sense right or legitimate. 35 The central motif of the America First platform is that international law carries little
or no authority for the United States. 36 This does not mean that the Trump
Administration always ignores international law. It does not. But it communicates—more regularly, more openly, and across a broader range of contexts than its recent predecessors ever did—that it does not take
international law seriously. If the United States happens to resort to international law, fine. If it does not, also fine. As one senior official explained,
Trump’s foreign policy doctrine is that “we’re America, and people can take
it or leave it.” 37 The United States does what it can, and the rest suffer what
they must.
The administration attacks the authority of international law in ways
large and small, direct and indirect. For example, President Trump told the
U.N. General Assembly in 2018 that “[w]e will never surrender America’s
sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global bureaucracy. America is
governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism.” 38 Trump’s
sovereignty language means something specific; it draws on a long political
tradition of insisting that states have absolute authority over their own affairs
and are accountable to no one. 39 Trump’s message to the General Assembly
was that states must preserve their national authority by repelling international law and the institutions that it creates. In his words, “nations must defend against threats to sovereignty . . . from global governance.” 40
The administration has also taken concrete steps to deny international
law of authority over the United States. It has withdrawn or indicated that it
would withdraw from multiple international agreements, including the Iran

35. E.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 30 (2d ed. 2009) (“[I]t is an essential feature of law that it claims legitimate authority.”); W. Michael Reisman, Address, International
Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101, 110 (1981) (“[A]
prescription is some authority signal which distinguishes demands backed up only by credible
threats—the demands of the thugs in our example—from law.”).
36. See Goldsmith & Mercer, supra note 33 (manuscript at 24) (“[Trump] persistently
talks as if he does not take international law, including United States commitments under it,
seriously.”).
37. Jeffrey Goldberg, A Senior White House Official Defines the Trump Doctrine: ‘We’re
America, Bitch,’ ATLANTIC (June 11, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018
/06/a-senior-white-house-official-defines-the-trump-doctrine-were-america-bitch/562511/
[https://perma.cc/53RA-LAJH]; see also Michael Anton, The Trump Doctrine, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Apr. 20, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/20/the-trump-doctrine-big-think-americafirst-nationalism/ [https://perma.cc/6BQ6-3WZT] (“Not only is there no superseding authority, no world government, above the nation-state to enforce transnational morality; there is also
no higher law for nations than the law of nature and no higher object than self-preservation
and perpetuation.”).
38. Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 2018 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 4 (Sept. 25, 2018) [hereinafter Remarks by President Trump].
39. See DON HERZOG, SOVEREIGNTY, R.I.P. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at ii) (on
file with the Michigan Law Review).
40. Remarks by President Trump, supra note 38.
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nuclear deal, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and the bilateral Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. 41 It has abandoned the Obama Administration’s support for the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 42 It has said that some treaties that are
almost universally ratified address issues that are, in its view, not appropriate
for international regulation. 43 It has criticized the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for encroaching on domestic affairs and then chosen
not to appear at commission hearings on the United States. 44 It has reportedly even decided that the State Department bureau for international organizations, which themselves are constituted by international law, will no longer
write memos using the words “international law.” 45
In addition, the administration has gone out of its way to attack the authority of international courts and tribunals. In October 2018, the United

41. Fact Sheet, White House, President Donald J. Trump Is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal (May 8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-irandeal/ [https://perma.cc.39GP-XABB]; Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, U.S.
Dep’t of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/
[https://perma.cc
/P925-4RS3]; Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S.
Withdrawal from the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019 (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.state.gov/u-swithdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-2019/ [https://perma.cc/4CN5-Y684]. For a partial list of other international arrangements that have been on the U.S. chopping block, see Hasan Dudar & Deirdre Shesgreen, Trump’s Long List of Global Trade Deals, Agreements Exited or
Renegotiated, USA TODAY (Nov. 21, 2018, 8:08 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/2018/11/21/donald-trump-foreign-policy-iran-nafta-russia-mexico-canada-trade/1732
952002/ [https://perma.cc/E7GP-E7LW].
42. Fact Sheet, White House, President Donald J. Trump Is Defending Our Sovereignty
and Constitutional Rights from the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-is-defending-our
-sovereignty-and-constitutional-rights-from-the-united-nations-arms-trade-treaty/ [https://
perma.cc/L64D-6QCG]; Presidential Memorandum from the White House to the United
States Trade Representative Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Negotiations and Agreement (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov
/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-transpacific-partnership-negotiations-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/R53N-T9YX].
43. See Draft Executive Order, Moratorium on New Multilateral Treaties,
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3424628/Read-the-Trump-administration-sdraft-of-the.pdf [https://perma.cc/74KG-V23M] (“Whether one agrees or disagrees with these
outcomes as a substantive policy matter, these are not appropriate matters for international
treaties.”).
44. See Jimena Galindo, U.S. Failure at the IACHR Sets a Dangerous Precedent in the
Region, GLOBAL AMERICANS (Oct. 12, 2018), https://theglobalamericans.org/2018/10/u-sfailure-at-the-iachr-sets-a-dangerous-precedent-in-the-region/
[https://perma.cc/ELA8URZW].
45. Colum Lynch & Robbie Gramer, Trump Appointee Compiles Loyalty List of U.S.
Employees at U.N., State, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 13, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com
/2018/06/13/trumps-vino-vixen-compiles-loyalty-list-of-u-s-employees-at-u-n-state-mari-stull
-political-appointee-state-department-international-organization-united-nations-political-ret
ribution-chaos-dysfunction/ [https://perma.cc/F3RT-9WP7].
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States announced that it would withdraw from two treaties that granted the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction over the United States and
that had recently been invoked for that purpose. 46 Trump’s national security
adviser, John Bolton, explained that the withdrawals had less to do with the
two pending cases “than with the continued consistent policy of the United
States to reject the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which
we think is politicized and ineffective.” 47 The decision relates, Bolton said,
“to the nature of so-called purported international courts to be able to bind
the United States.” 48 Notice that Bolton’s language specifically targets the
ICJ’s authority over the United States. Similarly, the President told the U.N.
General Assembly that, “[a]s far as America is concerned, the [International
Criminal Court] has no jurisdiction, no legitimacy, and no authority.” 49 And
as of December 2019, U.S. actions have caused the Appellate Body of the
World Trade Organization to stall out. 50
Then there are discrete incidents that highlight the administration’s disregard for international law. Take Trump’s decision, in April 2019, to recognize Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, a small strip of land that
Israel seized from Syria during the 1967 Israeli-Arab War. 51 A bedrock rule
of international law prohibits forcible annexations of foreign territory, so as
a matter of international law, the territory belongs to Syria, even though Israel has for decades occupied it. 52 The U.S. decision to recognize Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights was inconsistent with this bedrock rule.
Many would say that the U.S. decision itself violated international law. 53 But
46. See John Bolton, Ambassador to the United Nations, Remarks on the Withdrawal
from the Optional Protocol on Dispute Resolution to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (Oct. 3, 2018), https://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/johnboltonviennaoptional
protcolsuswithdrawl.htm [https://perma.cc/E7ZY-6KU3]; Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State,
U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks to the Media (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.state.gov/remarks-tothe-media-3/ [https://perma.cc/H9FB-HG4E].
47. Bolton, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. Remarks by President Trump, supra note 38.
50. For evidence that these actions at the World Trade Organization are part of the
broader project to contest the authority of international law, see Stewart M. Patrick, Trump’s
Search for Absolute Sovereignty Could Destroy the WTO, WORLD POL. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/27692/trump-s-search-for-absolute-sovereignty
-could-destroy-the-wto [https://perma.cc/AK5J-TLVD].
51. White House, Proclamation on Recognizing the Golan Heights as Part of the State
of Israel (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamationrecognizing-golan-heights-part-state-israel/ [https://perma.cc/Y9V7-N9HN].
52. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; S.C. Res. 487 (1981); S.C. Res 242 (1967).
53. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (Oct. 24, 1970) (“No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.”); Int’l Law Comm’n,
Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 112, 114 (2001) (proclaiming that “[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of [a peremptory norm of international law]” and that “the prohibition of aggression is to be regarded
as peremptory”).
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the striking thing about it was not that the United States might have violated
international law. It was that the president of the United States did not even
think to consult international law. 54 And in the immediate aftermath, when
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was pressed to defend the decision, he contemptuously brushed international law aside. What matters, he said, is “reality.” 55 “The Trump administration sees the world as it is, not as we wish it
would be.” 56
In fact, the administration is not just seeing the world as it is. In this
world, international law addresses virtually every facet of modern governance, including areas—such as the protection of women’s and children’s
rights—that the administration thinks “are not appropriate matters for international treaties.” 57 In this world, the ICJ is not a “so-called purported”
court with “purported binding jurisdiction”; 58 it is a real court with actual
cases and litigants and decisions that, though sometimes violated, are almost
always accepted as binding. And in this world, international institutions are
created by and have authority under international law, and governments use
these institutions to grapple with problems, like climate change and the
health of rape victims in war, that the administration would prefer to ignore. 59 So, the administration is not just describing the world; it is trying to
create a different world. It wants a world that is more like the one that realists pretend we already have, in which material interests and power are all

54. See Roberta Rampton, Trump Says He Made Golan Heights Decision After a Quick
History Lesson, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usatrump-israel/trump-says-he-made-golan-heights-decision-after-a-quick-history-lesson-idUSK
CN1RI0N7 [https://perma.cc/W9QD-SH8J] (reporting on Trump’s description of his decisionmaking process).
55. Julian Borger, Pompeo Flounders on Why Annexation Is Good for the Golan but Not
for Crimea, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/apr/11
/golan-heights-crimea-pompeo-us-state-department (embedding a video recording of Pompeo
and a State Department tweet quoting Pompeo).
56. Id. A month later, Pompeo coauthored an opinion piece that purports to justify the
recognition decision in international legal terms. Michael R. Pompeo & David Friedman, International Law Backs the Trump Golan Policy, WALL STREET J. (May 14, 2019, 7:11 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/international-law-backs-the-trump-golan-policy-11557875474
[https://perma.cc/J3NN-74BS]. This piece does not reflect serious legal work; it does not offer
cogent legal reasons for the recognition decision or grapple with the well-established, widely
held legal position to the contrary. Moreover, by the time it was published, the United States
had already communicated that international law was not in its view a relevant consideration.
57. Draft Executive Order, supra note 43.
58. Bolton, supra note 46.
59. E.g., Liz Ford, UN Waters Down Rape Resolution to Appease US’s Hardline Abortion
Stance, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2019, 3:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-develop
ment/2019/apr/23/un-resolution-passes-trump-us-veto-threat-abortion-language-removed
[https://perma.cc/7CBN-6QUQ] (on the reproductive health of victims of sexual violence in
armed conflicts); Somini Sengupta, U.S. Pressure Blocks Declaration on Climate Change at Arctic Talks, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/climate/us-arcticclimate-change.html [https://perma.cc/JW3P-WYYB] (on climate change).
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that matter on the international stage and the authority of international law
is, if not irrelevant, seriously diminished.
We can now bring into sharper focus what Koh’s analysis misses. If international law is worthwhile insofar as it contributes to certain material
outcomes, then its authority is entirely in the service of those outcomes, and
the administration’s approach to international law would be troubling only
to the extent that it detracts from them. For example, the Golan decision
would not be a problem in and of itself. The decision manifested only as a
verbal pronouncement and was not accompanied by material action. Although we might still worry about the decision, the reason to worry would
have to do with its downstream operational effects—for example, the risk
that it will at some point impede Israeli-Arab peace or lessen the inhibitions
on using force.
But like much else that the administration does, the Golan decision cannot be understood only in such material terms. The administration itself said
that it did not mean for the decision to have an operational effect, whether in
the Golan or under the prohibition of forcible annexations more generally. 60
Rather, its main point was to alter the normative valence of an intractable
status quo. Its central message was not that Israel could control the Golan—
that much was obvious—but that Israel may, that in the U.S. view, Israel has
the authority to rule as it does. Part of what made the decision so disconcerting is that the United States acted as if the international law to the contrary
was completely beside the point.
The perverse irony is that the administration’s actions and statements
that dislodge the authority of international law also reveal that it still matters.
It matters even where, as in the Golan, its material impact is imperceptible.
We know that it matters because the administration is expending energy to
undercut it, and lots of people are working to maintain it or are expressing
alarm about losing it. 61 The question is, why does it matter? Again, it might
in various ways have a material effect. But let’s assume for the time being
that it does not—that international law often tracks but does not appreciably
alter what global actors do “on the ground.” What would we lose if they did
the very same things without international law? As I explain below, we
would lose the argumentative practice that is emblematic of law.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY
A. International Law’s Argumentative Practice
Recall that, in general, law’s claim to authority highlights that material
power is not a sufficient basis for governing. Law thereby fosters the expectation that governance decisions must be rooted in authority; those who have

60. See Borger, supra note 55 (“The US policy continues to be that no country can
change the borders of another by force.” (quoting the State Department)).
61. On the Golan decision, see Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/PV.8495 (2019).
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the power to govern are expected to show not only that they can implement
a decision but that they may, that they have the authority to do what they
want to do. International law is no different in this respect. It also fosters expectations about authority. It just places the relevant authority beyond the
jurisdiction of any state, with different transnational collectivities—groups of
states, international institutions, and to varying degrees other actors that together create and maintain it.
Of course, once we expect the people in power to show that they have
the authority to make particular decisions, we begin to question whether
they in fact do. We disagree about who may make particular kinds of governance decisions, in what circumstances, for whom, and with what effects.
Law’s claim of authority thus generates debates about the exercise of that authority in concrete settings. It fuels an argumentative practice about how authority is used.
To be sure, people might argue about governance decisions even without law. But their arguments would not be in the same register. Law structures a particular kind of argumentative practice—one that is centered on
public authority. It directs the participants to tap into its own “fund of public
normative references.” 62 It requires them to justify their decisions publicly
and in terms that purport to reflect not just their own preferences but the interests and values of a broader group. It subjects their positions to external
scrutiny and debate. It prioritizes some normative principles and methods of
reasoning over others. It establishes institutions and processes that discipline
their interactions. And because international law places authority beyond the
jurisdiction of any state, it fosters this argumentative practice both within
and across national borders.
International law’s argumentative practice is sustained because enough
people who make global governance decisions act as if having authority for
their decisions matters. They try to defend their decisions in international
law and thus to earn authority for what they want to do. Where they instead
diminish or deny that authority, the argumentative practice withers. Arguing
about authority is hard to do if your adversary can’t be bothered to take it
seriously. 63

62. Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1513 (1988).
63. Shirley Scott has advanced a similar argument, though she speaks of the “ideology,”
rather than the “authority,” of international law:
Because the ideology is so valuable to the most powerful state, others within the international order have also been able to use it as leverage . . . against the most powerful, but this has been possible only so long as the most powerful have valued and
sustained the ideology.
Shirley V. Scott, The Decline of International Law as a Normative Ideal, 49 VICT. U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 627, 632 (2018).
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B. The Virtues of the Argumentative Practice
Although international relations and legal scholars widely recognize that
international law structures an argumentative practice, 64 many suggest that
this practice is just cheap talk, a means for achieving certain material ends,
or a foil that reinforces positions of power. 65 Yet quite a bit of legal and political philosophy assigns law’s argumentative practice independent value. Jeremy Waldron’s work is particularly instructive here. He emphasizes that the
argumentative practice that law promotes is a large part of what makes law,
as an enterprise, worthwhile. We value law not only because it sometimes
establishes conduct rules that constrain governmental discretion or can
make life predictable but also, and “at least as important,” because of “what
we do in law with the norms that we identify.” 66 “We do not just obey [legal
norms] or apply the sanctions that they ordain . . . .” 67 “[W]e use our sense of
what is at stake in their application to license a continual process of argument . . . about what it means to apply [the law] faithfully . . . .” 68 Waldron’s
insight is that arguing in law is desirable for reasons that cannot be traced to
whatever material outcomes it might produce. It is desirable, even when it
does not appear to settle an issue in dispute or to have an operational effect. 69
This insight is borne out in the everyday operation of international law.
To illustrate, consider the experience with U.S. targeted killing operations.
Despite the secrecy surrounding these operations, the United States began
justifying them publicly under both U.S. and international law in 2010, as
they became a routine part of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. 70 Koh himself,
as State Department Legal Adviser, delivered an early speech defending these
operations. 71 Other high-level officials followed suit. 72 And in December
2016, as the Obama Administration prepared to leave office, it released an
extensive report outlining its legal and policy positions on targeted killing
64. Martti Koskenniemi is probably the best-known proponent of this view. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT (2d ed. 2007).
65. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
66. Jeremy Waldron, Essay, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 56
(2008).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Some readers might claim that, if international law only structures an argumentative
practice, without resolving what ought to be done, it does not operate as law. I disagree; international law’s role in these circumstances is more constitutive than it is regulative—it is mostly
to structure an argumentative practice, rather than to prescribe certain outcomes—but it is
quintessentially legal in nature. See id.
70. For a compilation of the government’s written and oral pronouncements on these
operations, see JAMEEL JAFFER, THE DRONE MEMOS: TARGETED KILLING, SECRECY, AND THE
LAW (2016).
71. Id. at 119–25.
72. Id.
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operations. 73 During this period, the United States did not change its basic
legal position, which remains very controversial. But it used international
law to frame and elaborate on that position and to engage with its critics. 74
The Trump Administration has done much less of this. Putting aside the
question whether this disengagement from international law has affected
U.S. operations on the ground, there are at least three reasons to be alarmed.
1.

Respect

First, participating seriously in law’s argumentative practice is a way of
showing respect to the people who care about or are affected by particular
decisions. It treats people like they are not just pawns in a geopolitical game
of chess but individuals who deserve an account of what is happening and
why, and who might themselves have views on the subject that are worth
sharing. “Even if compliance is not the issue,” Frederick Schauer explains,
“giving reasons [for governance decisions] is still a way of showing respect
for the subject, and a way of opening a conversation rather than forestalling
one.” 75 Mark Tushnet agrees; the argumentative practice that law fosters
“express[es] respect for people as reasoning (and reasonable) beings,” which
“does seem an unqualified human good.” 76
When the United States tries to justify its lethal operations under international law, it recognizes that it owes various audiences, both within and
outside the United States, an explanation for its conduct. It concedes that it
may not kill people just because it can. It explains that its operations are
based on general principles that, though contested, reflect a considered view
of the public good, not, for example, the personal vendettas of the people
who happen to be pulling the triggers. And it acknowledges and responds to
competing normative positions. Of course, many people would prefer for the
United States to stop conducting these operations. But given that it will not,
its participation in the argumentative practice at least informs them of what
it is doing and why and invites them to think about its logic, voice their objections, and demand a reasoned response.
Three authors have recently drawn on similar themes to contest the
Trump Administration’s opacity on its targeted killing operations in Somalia:

73. WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE
UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS
(2016).
74. See JAFFER, supra note 70, at 7 (“Perhaps no administration before this one has tried
so assiduously to justify its resort to the weapons of war.”).
75. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 658 (1995).
76. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and the Rule of Law, in CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO THE RULE OF LAW (Marti Loughlin & Jens Meierhenrich eds., forthcoming)
(manuscript at 12) (on file with the Michigan Law Review); see also Waldron, supra note 66, at
23, 24 (explaining that law “is a mode of governing people that treats them with respect,”
which it does in large part through its argumentative practice).
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Greater transparency—including on what policies are in place to protect civilians in Somalia, on what standards are applied in legally defining and
distinguishing combatants from civilians, and on the investigations of civilian casualties—would go a long way to showing the U.S. government’s
commitment to the rights and dignity of the people of Somalia. 77

The claim here is that the United States commits independent wrongs by
disengaging from international law’s argumentative practice—by not outlining when or why it targets to kill people and “not consistently acknowledging specific strikes and responding in detail to allegations of civilian harm.” 78
U.S. disengagement denies Somalis whose loved ones have been killed “the
basic recognition of their loss.” 79 It deprives civilians of the information they
need to protect themselves from violence. And it frustrates the work of advocates who want to “communicate their concerns to the United States and
its local military partners.” 80 These grievances are ultimately not about the
merits of U.S. targeted killing operations. They are about the expectation
that the United States afford Somalis the basic dignity of explaining what it is
doing and why. And it’s not just for Somalis. Americans also deserve this information, given that the operations are conducted in our name. 81
2.

Transnational Politics

Second, international law’s argumentative practice can help constitute a
decent politics beyond the borders of any state. 82 It enables people in disparate parts of the world to engage together on the global governance issues that
they all care about, while structuring in relatively positive ways how they engage. It does so because arguing in law requires people to draw on a set of

77. Rahma A. Hussein et al., Transparency on Civilian Harm in Somalia Matters—Not
Just to Americans, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63554
/transparency-on-civilian-harm-in-somalia-matters-not-just-to-americans/ [https://perma.cc
/PN7E-WZA3].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Many commentators have pressed this point. E.g., Luke Hartig, I Helped Write the
Exec Order on Public Reporting of Lethal Operations. Here’s What Trump Has Undone., JUST
SECURITY (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63130/helped-write-exec-order-re
quired-public-reporting-u-s-lethal-operations-heres-trump-undone/ [https://perma.cc/XPK7HRK3]; Rachel Stohl, America Must Update Its Lethal Drone Policy—Here’s How, NAT’L INT.
(July 29, 2018), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/america-must-update-its-lethal-dronepolicy%E2%80%94heres-how-26591 [https://perma.cc/UM9W-QD49]; NGO Statement on
Reported Changes to U.S. Policy on Use of Armed Drones and Other Lethal Force, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Mar. 7, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/07/ngo-statement-re
ported-changes-us-policy-use-armed-drones-and-other-lethal-force [https://perma.cc/Q943QMDU] [hereinafter NGO Statement].
82. I have argued in other work that international law plays an important role in constituting political communities beyond the state. See Monica Hakimi, Constructing an International Community, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2017).
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shared resources—texts, analytic methods, sources of authority, institutions,
and so on—to explain why their preferences are consonant with the interests
or values of a group. 83
To be clear, the participants in these debates plainly disagree about
which policies promote the public good. Their disagreements might at times
run so deep that they cannot definitively or authoritatively be resolved. And
their legal positions will almost certainly be informed by their own interests
or passions. Still, there is value to putting them in conversation with one another and pushing them to “see themselves as belonging to the same political
association . . . [and] sharing a common symbolic space.” 84 As others have
explained, “debate over principle, over the common good and justice, is a
distinctive and invaluable moment of political life.” 85 It acquires a “depth
and seriousness of purpose” not because it is detached from or just a cloak
for the participants’ preferences but because it involves the “dissonant intertwining of principle and interest.” 86 Those who participate in law’s argumentative practice have to define their own priorities in relation to the group’s.
They must in some way contend with the politics of the group, confronting
what is at stake in concrete decisions not just for themselves but for others
who care about the decisions.
Without question, U.S. efforts to defend targeted killing operations in
law spawned years of intense debates. These debates played out in manifold
arenas—some domestic, others international—and among a broad group of
actors. 87 Although the participants were plainly motivated by their own interests and values, they also argued about principle; they pushed for their
priorities to be reflected in the shared “fund of public normative references.” 88 And although the U.S. legal position has not much changed, its critics evidently still want to argue about and focus the world’s attention on it,
rather than passively accept what the United States is doing as inevitable or
insoluble. 89 They want the United States to have to grapple with their opposing views.

83. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 277 (1941) (explaining that, in law,
“claims get made and urged in terms of the Order” and “tend powerfully to be set up as serving
the welfare of the relevant Entirety”).
84. CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL 20 (2005).
85. DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 152 (1998).
86. Id.
87. See Hakimi, supra note 30, at 1069–71 (describing this practice).
88. Michelman, supra note 62, at 1513.
89. See, e.g., NGO Statement, supra note 81; RACHEL STOHL, STIMSON CTR., AN ACTION
PLAN ON U.S. DRONE POLICY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 1
(2018).
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Accountability

Third, international law’s argumentative practice works to hold decisionmakers accountable for their actions. When they participate in this practice, they concede, even if only implicitly, that they need authority for what
they want to do and that this authority is not entirely of their own making.
They must earn it from other actors, both at the initial moment of international law’s creation and over time by trying to justify concrete decisions in
law and responding to competing legal claims. The argumentative practice
thus gives external actors an important say on whether particular conduct is
acceptable—whether the people in power have authority for what they want
to do. 90 Note that accountability here does not necessarily come from pushing decisionmakers toward compliance or subjecting them to material harm
for not complying. Accountability comes from cultivating the expectation
that governance decisions that lack authority are in some sense illegitimate
and from giving external actors a central role in conferring authority on, or
denying it to, the people who are in positions to make such decisions.
This mechanism for holding decisionmakers accountable might seem
unsatisfying to those who want international law to establish stable conduct
rules against which the legitimacy of particular decisions is definitively assessed. Yet even if this accountability mechanism is not ideal, it might be the
best one available. In the case of U.S. targeted killing operations, the applicable international law is extremely contentious. Because international legal
authority is collectively established, no one actor is entitled to resolve what
international law requires. Meanwhile, the United States appears to have almost complete operational control; others have not created discernible material deterrents to its operations. In these circumstances, the most realistic
alternative to accountability through the argumentative practice of international law is not for the United States to be constrained by international legal
rules that contravene its deeply held policy positions but for it to do as it
pleases, without trying to legitimize its actions to the various constituencies
that are paying attention. It’s hard to see why that alternative would make
the world a better place.
CONCLUSION
Koh and I are both critical of the Trump Administration’s approach to
international law. We both think that this approach is harmful for the United States and the world. But, I’ve argued, Koh does not fully elucidate why it
is harmful. Although his book is a thought-provoking and at times exhilarating read, it is an insufficient guide for grasping the challenges that we now
confront and, therefore, for putting us on a path to identifying possible correctives. And, so I’ve argued, this means that his theory of international law
90. See Reisman, supra note 35, at 110 (“It is the audience, whether or not its members
realize it, that endows the prescriber with the authority that renders his communications prescription.”).
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is also, in important respects, lacking. International law is about much more
than defining discrete policy goals and then habitually obeying the dictates
that get us there. It is also, and perhaps more importantly, about how we explain, justify, argue about, bolster, and undermine particular governance decisions, which must be made in concrete settings in which different policy
objectives invariably intersect and only some people’s priorities take precedence.
The remarkable thing about the post-Cold War period is that the world’s
unquestioned superpower has taken seriously international law’s claim of
authority over it. The dynamic has not been easy. The United States has often taken controversial positions on the content of international law, as it
does on targeted killing operations. It has at times violated foundational
rules of international law, such as by instituting a torture program at the
CIA. And it has resisted international law’s authority on discrete issues and
as exercised by particular institutions—for example, by opting out of the international legal regulation of economic, social, and cultural human rights
and declining to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
over U.S. nationals. But on the whole, the United States has acted like having
international legal authority for its decisions matters. It has worked hard to
establish and maintain this authority. And where it has strayed from mainstream legal positions, it has usually still taken seriously the practice of explaining and trying to justify its conduct with the resources of international
law. The Trump Administration is different, if not in kind, then certainly in
degree. 91 Its sweeping attacks on the authority of international law are
alarming not just because they might detract from discrete material outcomes (though they might) but also because, even if they do not, they strip
people around the world of a critical—in some contexts the only—tool for
contending with the United States’ awesome power and trying to render its
conduct legitimate.

91. Cf. Scott, supra note 63, at 634 (arguing that what weakens the ideology of international law “is not behaviour contrary to the principles per se” but “a combination of rhetoric
and action that implicitly asks its audience to believe the principles to be true while the audience at the same time gets the demonstration that this is not the case”).

